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The Elephant in the Room: What Is a
"Nonroutine" Border Search, Anyway?
Digital Device Searches Post-Riley
by EUNICE PARK*
Introduction
Since the Supreme Court handed down Riley v. California' in 2014,
we have been assured that if we are pulled over for speeding, the officer
may not search our cell phone without a warrant. Another potential privacy
peril, however, continues to loom: the international border. As the law
currently stands, law enforcement agents may search our electronic
devices, including cell phones and laptops, without any particularized
suspicion, as we attempt to return into the United States from a trip abroad.
Is this consistent with Riley? Or with the Fourth Amendment?
The wide latitude circuit courts have given government agents to
conduct border searches has had a wrinkle since the 2013 en banc decision
United States v. Cotterman, which deemed a forensic probe into the
defendant's laptop "essentially a computer strip search."2 In an 8-3 ruling,
the Ninth Circuit held that agents must have "reasonable suspicion" before
they can conduct a "thorough and detailed search of the most intimate
details of one's life" contained within digital devices.3 "[T]he uniquely
sensitive nature of data on electronic devices carries with it a significant
expectation of privacy and thus renders an exhaustive exploratory search
* Associate Professor of Lawyering Skills, Western State College of Law. A special thank
you to Western State College of Law Librarian Scott Frey for his invaluable research assistance;
and Professors Robert Molko and Elizabeth Jones for their expertise and insights. The views
expressed in this article are the author's own. I am grateful always to my parents, husband and
children. I dedicate this article to my mom, Kyung S. Park, and to the memory of my dad, Jong
M. Park.
1. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
2. United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 966 (9th Cir. 2013).
3. Id. at 968.
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more intrusive than with other forms of property."4 Cotterman raises
perhaps as many questions as it answers: what is an "exhaustive
exploratory search?" Is it only a "forensic" examination? What is a
"forensic" examination? Could a search that is less than "forensic" ever be
considered "exhaustive" or "exploratory?" If so, at what point does the
search cross the threshold from routine to nonroutine?
It was one year later that the Supreme Court produced its landmark
decision in Riley, declaring that a warrant is required to search a cell phone,
even one found on the person during a search incident to arrest.5 Chief
Justice Roberts explained that "[c]ell phones differ in both a quantitative
and a qualitative sense from other objects that might be kept on an
arrestee's person" because of "their immense storage capacity."6 Indeed,
"many of the more than 90% of American adults who own a cell phone
keep on their person a digital record of nearly every aspect of their lives-
from the mundane to the intimate."7 Cell phones actually function as
"minicomputers that also happen to have the capacity to be used as a
telephone."8 Moreover, the Court noted that cell phones also carry new
kinds of data: browsing history, historical location information, and even
information "located elsewhere," and that there is no way for officers to
"know whether the information they are viewing was stored locally at the
time of the arrest or has been pulled from the cloud."9 For these reasons,
the Court rejected the cell phone as container analogy.io
The Court also rejected the government's various "flawed proposals"
for permitting warrantless cell phone searches under certain circumstances,
such as allowing a warrantless search "whenever it is reasonable to believe
that the phone contains evidence of the crime of arrest";" allowing a cell
phone search of restricted areas of the phone;12 allowing a search of a
phone's call log;' 3 or allowing a search of data that officers could have
obtained from a pre-digital counterpart.14 The Court pointed out that such
an analogue test would allow law enforcement to search both a vast
4. Id at 966.
5. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2473.
6. Id. at 2489.
7. Id. at 2490.
8. Id. at 2489.
9. Id at 2491.
10. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014).
11. Id at 2491-92.
12. Id. at 2492.
13. Id. at 2492-93.
14. Id. at 2493.
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quantity and vast array of information, and "would launch courts on a
,015difficult line-drawing expedition ....
The Court acknowledged that its decision will impact the ability of
law enforcement to combat crime; admittedly, "[p]rivacy comes at a
cost."'6 However, the Court did leave the door ajar for warrantless
searches where exigent circumstances arise under "some of the more
extreme hypotheticals that have been suggested: a suspect texting an
accomplice who, it is feared, is preparing to detonate a bomb, or a child
abductor who may have information about the child's location on his cell
phone." 7 What the Court found fundamentally concerning, however, was
the immense privacy implications that warrantless cell phone searches
would pose. Its answer "to the question of what police must do before
searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest is accordingly simple-
get a warrant."18
The U.S. Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of certiorari to
have Cotterman heard along with Riley.19 Yet, laptops are not just
"minicomputers," but are actual computers and raise the same privacy
concerns as cell phones, with an "immense storage capacity" just like cell
phones. How might Riley impact border laptop searches? Moreover, how
might Riley impact border searches of digital devices generally?
While other scholars have addressed this issue, this Article proposes a
bright-line rule for border searches of laptops and other digital devices that
resolves the problematic nature of the routine/nonroutine dichotomy by
obviating it: All digital border searches, including laptops, should be
subject to a reasonable suspicion standard without reference to whether the
search is "routine" or "nonroutine." At the same time, in law
enforcement's favor, this Article proposes that "border search" should not
be tied to unmeaningful distinctions between inbound and outbound
travelers, or imminent, versus ongoing, crime.
Part I of this Article describes the Fourth Amendment expectation of
privacy and how that expectation is diminished at the border. Part II
presents the history and precedent behind the routine versus nonroutine
searches of laptops at the border, which leads to the Ninth Circuit split
from other courts on the issue and some of the cases that have continued to
develop the border laptop search issue since Riley and Cotterman. Part III
provides a brief overview of the current literature that broadly can be
15. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 2494.
18. Id at 2495.
19. United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 899 (2014).
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described as offering three major categories of approaches for border
laptop searches: (1) reasonable suspicion should be required for all digital
device searches; (2) reasonable suspicion should be required for some
digital device searches; or (3) reasonable suspicion should never be
required for digital device searches. Part IV proposes a straightforward
alternative that follows the Riley example and the Supreme Court's
expressed preference for "clear guidance to law enforcement through
categorical rules" 2 0 : all digital border searches should be subject to a
reasonable suspicion standard. This Article explains that the paradigm for
digital searches should change by briefly addressing three precepts: (1) the
privacy concerns implicated by Riley for searching "cell phones" apply to
all digital devices; (2) an expectation of privacy still lives at the border for
digital devices; and (3) case-by-case assessments are undesirable. This
Article then offers an alternative that first, takes the elephant out of the
room; second, maintains the balance between law enforcement and
individual privacy by suggesting that this digital border search doctrine
should apply equally to travelers exiting, as well as entering the United
States, without being bound to pre-digital era notions of imminent, versus
ongoing, crime.
I. The Fourth Amendment and the Diminished Expectation of
Privacy at the Border2 1
The Fourth Amendment protects the "right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects" and mandates that a search or
seizure conducted by a government agent must be "reasonable."22
Although no general constitutional right to privacy exists and is not
expressly written into the amendment's language,23 Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence encompasses an expectation of privacy.24 The Fourth
Amendment originally "was understood to embody a particular concern for
government trespass,"25 but since Katz v. United States, it also implicates a
20. Id.at2491.
21. Portions of this passage are adapted from my article, Eunice Park, Traffic Ticket
Reasonable, Cell Phone Search Not: Applying the Search Incident-to-Arrest Exception to the Cell
Phone as "Hybrid", 60 DRAKE L. REv. 429 (2012).
22. U.S. CONST. amend.IV.
23. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment cannot
be translated into a general constitutional 'right to privacy."'); see also Newhard v. Borders, 649
F. Supp. 2d 440, 449-50 (W.D. Va. 2009) ("[A]ny plausible claim would [not] arise ... under
privacy rights protected by the Constitution . . . .").
24. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 ("[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.").
25. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2012).
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reasonable expectation of privacy.26 To invoke Fourth Amendment
protection against unreasonable or warrantless searches based on a "Katz
invasion of privacy,"27 the area searched must be one in which there is a
"constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.",28 This
constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy consists of
both a subjective and objective requirement: "first[,] that a person have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy, and second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."'2 9
Once this expectation of privacy is established, the burden is on the
government to justify a warrantless search. "[T~he Constitution requires
'that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer . . . be
interposed between the citizen and the police . . . .,,,31 A warrantless search
is per se unreasonable, "subject only to a few specifically established and
well-delineated exceptions."32 Under the exceptions, certain types of
searches and seizures are per se valid even in the absence of probable cause
or a warrant.33 The "border search" is one such exception.34  The
traditional tension under the Fourth Amendment between the interests of
the Government and the privacy right of the individual generally favors the
Government at the border.35
The broad contours of the scope of searches at our
international borders are rooted in the "long-standing right
of the sovereign to protect itself by stopping and
examining persons and property crossing into this
country . . . ." Thus, border searches form "a narrow
26. Id. at 406-08; but see id. at 422 (Alito, J., concurring) (interpreting Katz as "finally
[doing] away with the old approach, holding that a trespass was not required for a Fourth
Amendment violation").
27. Id. at 408 n. 5.
28. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J.,concurring).
29. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); see id at 352
(holding that a person in a telephone booth could rely upon the protection of the Fourth
Amendment because "[o]ne who occupies [a telephone booth], shuts the door behind him, and
pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters
into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast o the world").
30. Id. at 357-59.
31. Id. at 357 (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82(1963)).
32. Id.
33. See generally Katz, 389 U.S. 347,357.
34. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977).
35. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973) ("The needs of law
enforcement stand in constant tension with the Constitution's protections of the individual against
certain exercises of officialpower.").
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exception to the Fourth Amendment prohibition against
warrantless searches without probable cause." Because
"[t]he Government's interest in preventing the entry of
unwanted persons and effects is at its zenith at the
international border . . . border searches are generally
deemed reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they
occur at the border."3 6
Two categories of border searches coexist: "routine" and
"nonroutine."37 A "routine" search of a person and his or her effects
crossing an international border into the United States is not subject to any
requirement of reasonable suspicion that an item contains contraband or
evidence of criminal activity.38 Border officials can conduct "routine"
searches without any individualized suspicion.3 9 On the other hand, a
"nonroutine" search, involving a high degree of intrusion, such as a strip
search, requires "reasonable suspicion," which is some particularized and
objective basis for suspecting wrongdoing.40 A "routine" search crosses
the threshold and becomes "nonroutine" if the search is either particularly
offensive, including an intrusive search of the body, or physically
destructive.41 Then, the presumption that most border searches do not
require any suspicion of wrongdoing to be justified is rebutted.42  Such a
36. United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 960 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Ramsey, 431 U.S.
at 616 (1977); United States v. Seljan, 547 F.3d 993, 999 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Flores-
Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004)).
37. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985).
38. See generally United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977) (regarding a customs
inspection ofmail).
39. See Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152 (citing Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 538).
40. See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541; see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21
(1968) ("And in justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to
specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant that intrusion.").
41. United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1007-08 (9th Cir. 2008); cf YULE KIM,
PROTECTING THE U.S. PERIMETER: BORDER SEARCHES UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 2
(2009) (similarly describing "(1) an intrusive search of the body, (2) a particularly destructive
search of property, or (3) a search conducted in a particularly offensive manner").
42. KiM, supra note 41, at 2; see United States v. Seljan, 547 F.3d 993, 1003 (9th Cir. 2008)
("In United States v. Ramos-Saenz, 36 F.3d 59, 61 (9th Cir. 1994), we concluded that a border
search goes beyond the routine 'only when it reaches the degree of intrusiveness present in a strip
search or body cavity search' and that the search of the defendant's shoes in that case did not go
beyond routine. In the context of vehicle searches, we have accepted the possibility that a search
could conceivably be so destructive that it would exceed its reasonable scope, but have rejected
arguments that the limit was exceeded in particular cases." (citations omitted)).
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search is considered more invasive and requires a minimal showing of
reasonable suspicion.4 3
II. Some Key Case Law Pre- and Post-Cotterman and Riley
Part II discusses how searches of laptops and other digital devices
have been approached at the border. The cases will demonstrate that courts
generally have been reluctant to grant defendants' motions to suppress
evidence obtained from digital device border searches, holding that
reasonable suspicion was present, whether or not it was required." Since
searches regularly have met the threshold for individualized suspicion for
invasive searches, the courts generally have not pursued what makes a
search routine or nonroutine.45 Thus, the courts' proclivity traditionally has
been to protect the Government's interests.46 However, since Cotterman
and Riley, courts are beginning to attempt to differentiate between routine
and nonroutine searches and to exhibit concern when the search produces
voluminous quantities of data.47
A. Pre-Cotterman and Riley
Courts did not always reach the question of whether reasonable
suspicion was required where the search was supported by reasonable
suspicion anyway.48 The Fourth Circuit observed that computer searches,
"[a]s a practical matter ... are most likely to occur only where-as here-
the traveler's conduct or the presence of other items in his possession
suggest he need to search further."49
Even forensic analysis was permitted with little fanfare pre-
Cotterman. In United States v. Romm, the court held that forensic analysis
used by the U.S. Immigration and Custom Enforcement ("ICE") agents to
43. See, e.g., United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 966 (9th Cir. 2013).
44. See, e.g., United States v. Hassanshahi, 75 F. Supp. 3d 101, 118 (D.D.C. 2014).
45. KiM, supra note 41, at 17 ("[C]ourts have also been far more reticent in determining
whether these types of searches are routine or non-routine. Instead, they have found that
reasonable suspicion supported the searches, and, thus, they did not reach the question.").
46. See, e.g., United States v. Hassanshahi, 75 F. Supp. 3d 101, 118 (D.D.C. 2014).
47. See generally United States v. Kim, 103 F. Supp. 3d 32 (D.D.C. 2015); United States v.
Djibo, 151 F. Supp. 3d 297 (E.D.N.Y.2015).
48. See KiM, supra note 41, at 17 ("Some lower federal courts ... have held that searches
of laptops and other forms of electronic storage devices fall under the border search
exception.").
49. United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 507 (4th Cir. 2005) (noting that customs official
searched Defendant's van without a warrant near the Canadian border after noticing contents of
van were inconsistent with Defendant's story of traveling on vacation; and the customs officials
discovered, during a routine search, a videotape that focused excessively on a young ballboy
during a tennis match and ultimately found childpomography).
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recover deleted child pornography fell under the border search exception.5 0
The court ultimately deemed the search routine and did not require
probable cause, reasonable suspicion, or a warrant.1 Yet the court went to
lengths to describe the defendant's conduct, including his statement,
"That's it. My life's over," and adopting a "confessional mode," even
telling agents they had "every right to arrest him and would probably do
so."S2
Courts have not been swayed by defendants' argument that a
computer contains highly private information and therefore should not be
included under the umbrella of routine searches. One district court
rebuked,
[t]he Defendant would have this Court impute the same
level of privacy and dignity afforded to the sovereignty of
a person's being to an inanimate object like a computer.
The Court finds this argument without merit. . . . [T]his
Court cannot equate the search of a computer with the
search of a person. The Court finds that the search of a
computer is more analogous to the search of a vehicle
and/or its contents.53
50. United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 2006).
51. Id. at 1006.
52. Id. at 994-95.
53. United States v. McAuley, 563 F. Supp. 2d 672, 677-78 (W.D. Tex. 2008) ("Incredible
amounts of personal and sensitive information are already subject to scrutiny at ports of
entry . . . . People carry personal items . .. [that] are already subject to routine border searches.
A computer is simply an inanimate object made up of microprocessors and wires which happens
to efficiently condense and digitize the information reflected . . . . The fact that a computer make
take such personal information and digitize it does not alter the Court's analysis."); see also, e.g.,
House v. Napolitano, No. I l-10852-DJC, 2012 WL 1038816, at *1 (D. Mass. Mar. 28 2012).
Though this decision is unpublished, the district court's use of strong language in its holding that
the digital search did not require reasonable suspicion is informative. House contended that a
"search of a laptop and electronic devices implicates one's 'dignity and privacy interests,' not
because there was any disrobing, physical search of his person, force used or exposure to pain or
danger, but because such devices contain information concerning one's thoughts, ideas and
communications and associations with others." Id. at *7. The court disagreed:
[A] search of a laptop computer or other electronic devices does not involve
the same "dignity and privacy interests" as the "highly intrusive searches of
the person" found to require some level of suspicion such as strip searches
or body cavity searches. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152. The Supreme
Court has not explicitly held that all property searches are routine or that
such searches are categorically incapable of implicating the "dignity and
privacy interests of the person being searched," id., but the search of one's
personal information on a laptop computer, a container that stores
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The Court noted further that "[a] search of items like a computer,
unlike a strip search of a person, is not per se embarrassing."54 In
conclusion, the defendant's computer, hard drives, and any other
belongings transported in his vehicle constituted "cargo," and the customs
agents' searches of the computer and external hard drives at port of entry
were routine border searches.
United States v. Arnold similarly held that so long as a search is of a
physical object rather than a person's body, reasonable suspicion is not
required as long as the search is not physically destructive or particularly
56offensive. The court held that a laptop is legally equivalent to property
and a search does not intrude on a person's dignity and privacy interests to
the same degree as a search of a traveler's body.57 The characteristics that
make electronic devices unique, including vast storage capacity and the
ability to track its user's habits, tastes, and preferences, were determined to
be not legally significant.5 8 "Whatever 'particularly offensive manner'
might mean, this search certainly does not meet that test." 59
A case that has been a point of contrast to digital searches involved the
overnight detention of a woman who eventually expelled eighty-eight
balloons of cocaine while in custody. In United States v. Montoya de
Hernandez, customs officials had a "reasonable suspicion" based on the
suspect's inconsistent and implausible story that she was smuggling drugs
in her alimentary canal.60 The detention was "long, uncomfortable, indeed,
humiliating," but supported by "the presence of articulable suspicion of
information, even personal information, does not invade one's dignity and
privacy in the same way as an involuntary x-ray, body cavity or strip search
of person's body or the type of search that have been held to be non-routine
and require the government to assert some level of suspicion.
Rather, the search of House's laptop and electronic devices is more akin to
the search of a suitcase and other closed containers holding personal
information travelers carry with them when they cross the border which may
be routinely inspected by customs and require no particularized suspicion.
Id.
54. McAuley, 563 F.Supp. 2d at 678.
55. Id at 679.
56. United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1007-10 (9th Cir. 2008).
57. Id. at 1008-09.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1009.
60. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 531 (1985).
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smuggling ."61 A recurring refrain has been that "a piece of
property . . . simply does not implicate the same 'dignity and privacy'
concerns as 'highly intrusive searches of the person."'62
B. Post-Cotterman and Riley
Since Cotterman and Riley, courts have begun to exhibit self-
consciousness of the lack of clarity on (1) whether or not reasonable
suspicion is needed for digital device searches; and (2) if reasonable
suspicion is needed, how to delineate the difference between routine and
nonroutine searches.
1. IsReasonableSuspicionEverNeeded?
One approach to the issue of whether reasonable suspicion is ever
needed has been to deliberately avoid it. In United States v. Hassanshahi,
law enforcement agents were alerted that Hassanshahi, a suspect involved
in a prior federal law enforcement investigation into potential violations of
the Iran trade embargo, would be returning to the United States the next
day through the Los Angeles International Airport.63 He was referred to
secondary screening and law enforcement conducted a forensic search of
his laptop.64 The court stated, "because the Court ultimately concludes that
there was reasonable suspicion for the forensic examination of
Hassanshahi's laptop, the constitutional question of whether that
examination required reasonable suspicion becomes moot."65 Additionally,
the court included a lengthy footnote distinguishing its approach from that
of the courts in Cotterman and United States v. Saboonchi, both of which
"found reasonable suspicion for the respective forensic computer
examinations, yet . . . spent considerable space addressing a constitutional
question that had no practical effect on the final disposition of the case."
66
By contrast, the Hassanshahi Court found "that engaging in such an
61. Id. at 544.
62. United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1008 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v.
Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004)).
63. United States v. Hassanshahi, 75 F. Supp. 3d 101, 105 (D.D.C. 2014); see United States
v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536 (D. Md. 2014) (holding that warrantless forensic search of cell
phone and flash drive at border was supported by reasonable suspicion). See cases cited in
Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 560.
64. Hassanshahi, 75 F. Supp. 3d at 106-07.
65. Id. at 119.
66. Id.atll9n.11.
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exercise would be imprudent unless reasonable suspicion was found not to
exist."6 7
Other courts note that the reasonable suspicion requirement is
unresolved and go on to reject the notion that a laptop search, even a
forensic one, requires any particularized suspicion at all, echoing some of
the pre-Cotterman decisions. For example, in United States v. Feiten, the
district court held that "[a]llowing customs officials without a warrant to
forensically search an electronic device presented at an international border
or its equivalent is utterly consistent with its historical mooring of
protecting the country by preventing unwanted goods from crossing the
border into the country."'6 8 Even if any level of suspicion was required, it
would only be reasonable suspicion.6 9
Even if the court were to find that making "a full digital
copy [of] the computer's hard drive" and testing it was
considered a highly intrusive search that infringed on
Defendant's "dignity and privacy interests," . . . -
although the court is not at all convinced that it was-
Defendant has failed to point to any authority suggesting
that such a conclusion would necessitate a warrant. To the
contrary, the Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit have both
indicated that even the highly intrusive searches that are
carried out in a "particularly offensive manner" such as
"strip searches or body cavity searches" require only that
the border agents to have reasonable suspicion [sic]. 70
The court outright dismissed concerns expressed in Riley about
searching digital technology: "Laptops and cell phones are indeed
becoming quantitatively, and perhaps qualitatively, different from other
67. Id See generally cases cited in Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 560. See also United
States v. Wallace, No. 1:12-CR-230-1-TWT, 2013 WL 1702791, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 19,
2013); United States v. Martinez, No. 13CR3560-WQH, 2014 WL 3671271, at *1 (S.D. Cal. July
22, 2014); United States v. Molina-Gomez, 781 F.3d 13, 19-20 (1st Cir. 2015); United States v.
Kim, 103 F. Supp. 3d 32, 53 (D.D.C. 2015); United States v. Blue, No. 1-14-CR-244-SCJ,
2015 WL 1519159, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 1, 2015) ("It is not necessary, however, to determine
whether the intrusion into the cell phone would require a higher standard of justification than
merely Defendant's presence at the border. Here, . . . it is beyond cavil (and, indeed, beyond
peradventure as well) that the officers had reasonable grounds . . . to suspect that evidence of
drug importation would likely be found on Defendant's ... cell phone.").
68. United States v. Feiten, No. 15-20631, 2016 WL 894452, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 9,
2016).
69. Id. at *7.
70. Id. (internal references and citations omitted).
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items, but that simply means there is more room to hide digital contraband,
and therefore more storage space that must be searched."7 1
2. IfReasonable Suspicion Is Needed, in What Kinds ofSearches?
For those courts that have begun to consider the difference between
routine and nonroutine searches and have ventured to resolve that a
nonroutine search requires reasonable suspicion, while a routine search
does not, the terms to distinguish the two searches are vague and the
analysis seems strained.
One district court attempted to distinguish between routine and
nonroutine searches by differentiating between a "quick look" and an
"exhaustive search."72 In Abidor v. Napolitano, the court held that border
agents had reasonable suspicion, supporting further inspection of a
graduate student's electronic devices and describing a "quick look" as
"only a cursory search that an officer may perform manually. It involves
opening the computer and viewing the computer's contents as any lay
person might be capable of doing simply by clicking through various
folders."73 A forensic examination, in contrast, "involves an exhaustive
search of a computer's entire hard drive," including "a hard drive's
unallocated space."74 The district court in United States v. Caballero
likewise agreed that a "cursory" search of a cell phone, without reasonable
suspicion, is permissible at the border.
One month after Caballero, in United States v. Kolsuz, a district court
in Virginia observed that "the line between routine and nonroutine border
searches remains somewhat indistinct," but determined that "the
juxtaposition of the two searches of defendant's iPhone well-illustrates
where the dividing line exists with respect to the border searches of
electronic devices."76 The court held that the first search, a "manual
inspection of text messages and recent calls on defendant's iPhone," was a
routine search.7 7 On the other hand, an off-site forensic search was a
nonroutine border search that must be supported by particularized
71. Id. at *6; see United States v. Dattmore, No. 12-CR-166A, 2013 WL 4718614 at *4
(W.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2013) (suggesting that a search of a computers and electronic devices is akin
to searching luggage or personal belongings traditionally considered routine searches and
likewise do not require reasonable suspicion); United States v. Thompson, 53 F. Supp. 3d 919,
922-23 (W.D. La. 2014).
72. Abidor v. Napolitano, 990 F. Supp. 2d 260, 269-70 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
73. Id. at 269-70.
74. Id. (citing United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 960 (9th Cir. 2013)).
75. United States v. Caballero, 178 F. Supp. 3d 1008, 1016 (S.D. Cal. 2016).
76. United States v. Kolsuz, 185 F. Supp. 3d 843, 854 (E.D. Va. 2016).
77. Id. at 854-55 (citing United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 505-06 (4th Cir. 2005)).
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suspicion.78 Seeming to grasp for a frame of reference, the court noted that
the second, forensic search "was not as extensive as the forensic search in
Saboonchi, to be sure," but ultimately concluded that the search
"nonetheless implicated significant privacy interests. To suggest otherwise
is like suggesting that a strip search does not implicate a significant privacy
interest so long as the government does not look between the person's
toes."79 Accordingly, "although the Supreme Court's decision in Riley
appears to indicate that cell phones deserve the highest level of Fourth
Amendment protection available, the highest protection available for a
border search is reasonable suspicion."so Thus, "a nonroutine border search
of a cell phone is constitutional if it is supported by reasonable
suspicion."8'
Another district court seemed to define a conventional search largely
by the amount of time, as a practical matter, that a customs officer can
spend.82 In United States v. Saboonchi, the court explained:
[A] conventional search is limited by the amount of time
one [c]ustoms officer has to devote to reviewing the
contents of digital evidence at the border . . . . [T]he
amount of data searched will be a mere fraction of what is
on the device, given the storage capacity of modern
electronic devices.83
78. Kolsuz, 185 F. Supp. 3d at 858.
79. Id. at 857 (referencing United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 539-40 (D.
Md. 2014)). Defendant's digital devices were seized at the border, imaged, and thereafter
forensically searched using specialized software.
80. Kolsuz, 185 F. Supp. 3d at 858-59.
81. Id. at 859.
82. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 547.
83. Id. A "conventional inspection of electronic media and a review of the files on them" is
routine, because it is akin to reviewing physical papers. Id. at 552. In contrast, a forensic
examination is distinguished by the use of "sophisticated technology-assisted search
methodologies [that] can exceed vastly the capacity of a human searching and viewing files.
Moreover, this type of search exposes a class of data that raises novel privacy concerns, including
files that a user had marked as 'deleted' and location data that may provide information about
activities in the home and away from the border." Id at 547-48. Accordingly, forensic searches
may be conducted if a Customs officer has a reasonable, particularized suspicion that a particular
device contains contraband or evidence of criminal activity. Id. at 570. Following the April
2014 decision, Defendant moved for reconsideration in light of the June 2014 Riley decision.
United States v. Saboonchi, 48 F. Supp. 3d 815, 816 (D. Md. 2014). In July 2014, the district
court denied Defendant's motion for reconsideration, finding that Riley "involved conventional
searches, not forensic searches . . . ." Id. at 819. Accordingly, "[a]n invasive and warrantless
border search may occur on no more than reasonable suspicion ..... Id.
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Border searches producing large quantities of data have triggered
similar concerns. For example, in United States v. Kim, the court held that
the pre-planned warrantless search of the laptop computer, seized before
the defendant boarded the plane, "was supported by so little suspicion of
ongoing or imminent criminal activity, and was so invasive of
[defendant's] privacy," that it violated the Fourth Amendment.84 The court
was concerned that agents had asked for and obtained a warrant but
conducted no further search because they had already obtained all the
information from the initial search.8 5 The defendant's hard drive had been
copied so it could be searched for an indefinite duration using specialized
software, and the examination occurred for weeks at a location other than
the border.86 The Court described the search of Kim's laptop as falling
"somewhere on the spectrum between the two poles [of forensic and non-
forensic searches] described by other courts."87 Indeed, the Court pointedly
noted that "the forensic specialist . . . acknowledged that the term 'forensic
search' can describe a range of examinations and that the term has no
specific definition."8 8 Ultimately the court concluded that the search was
"nothing more than a fishing expedition to discover what Kim might have
been up to."89 Echoing Riley, the court deemed it inappropriate to simply
categorize the laptop as a "container" to assess the search's
reasonableness.90 In fact, "while the immediate national security concerns
were somewhat attenuated, the invasion of privacy was substantial,"
leading the Court to "ask itself whether the examination in this case can
accurately be characterized as a border search at all." 91
A "921 page 'peek' into a cell phone at the border was similarly
found to be objectionable.92 In United States v. Djibo, the defendant was
stopped before the actual jet way and found to be carrying "a number of
84. United States v. Kim, 103 F. Supp. 3d 32, 59 (D.D.C. 2015).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 57.
87. Id. at 52. Ultimately the court was forced to turn to the traditional weighing of intrusion
of privacy against protecting legitimate government interests. Id. at55.
88. Id. at 52.
89. United States v. Kim, 103 F. Supp. 3d 32,46 (D.D.C. 2015).
90. Id. at 55; cf United States v. Molina-Gomez, 781 F.3d 13, 17, 19-20 (1st Cir. 2015)
(holding that even assuming the search a search of physical space in the hardware of a computer
disassembled by agents, where bags of heroin were found hidden inside, was non-routine,
reasonable suspicion existed to justify the search). See United States v. Lara, 815 F.3d 605, 610-
11 (9th Cir. 2016) (distinguishing between property as physical objects that can be possessed,
versus data, which is information that "not only cannot be possessed physically; it is also not
'under [Lara's] control"').
91. Kim, 103 F. Supp. 3d at 56-57.
92. United States v. Djibo, 151 F. Supp. 3d 297, 309 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
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cellular phones."93 After he was arrested and Mirandized, law enforcement
agents "ran an initial Cellebrite report or an initial search on the phonejust
a preliminary peek."94 When the "Court requested a copy of what the
government called a 'peek,' . . . the government surprisingly revealed that
the report would be voluminous."95 Eventually the government asked the
court "to find that the warrantless 'peek' into his phone is suppressible, but
not the thousands of pages retrieved through a subsequent forensic search"
obtained via warrant.96 The court held that the search was unreasonable
since the search warrant relied on the "poisonous 'peek"' and any
information obtained was fruit of the illegal initial search of the phone.97
Although the case holding hinges on technicality of the defendant not being
Mirandized, the court was concerned with the nature of the "poisonous
peek," pointedly noting,
[A]s the Riley court held, a cell phone is not just a physical
object containing information. It is more personal than a
purse or a wallet . . . . It is the combined footprint of what
has been occurring socially, economically, personally,
psychologically, spiritually and sometimes even sexually,
in the owner's life, and it pinpoints the whereabouts of the
owner over time with greater precision than any tool
heretofore used by law enforcement without aid of a
warrant. In today's modern world, a cell phone passcode
is the proverbial "key to a man's kingdom."98
Thus, the current status of the case law is well captured by the Kolsuz
court:
Although the Supreme Court has not made pellucid exactly
what renders a border search nonroutine-and what level
of individualized suspicion is necessary for nonroutine
searches-circuit courts have looked to the intrusiveness of
the search in distinguishing between routine and
93. Id. at 299.
94. Id. at 302 (citing law enforcement agent's testimony in transcript).
95. Id. at 303.
96. Id. at 307-08.
97. United States v. Djibo, 151 F. Supp. 3d 297, 309-10 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
98. Id. at 310; see United States v. Cano, No. 16-cr-01770-BTM, 2016 WL 6920449, at *5
(D. Az. Nov. 23, 2016) (holding that the Cellebrite search was lawful since the border agents had
reasonable suspicion that evidence of narcotics trafficking may exist on the cell phone).
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nonroutine border searches. . . . Less clear, however, is
whether digital searches of electronic devices-such as
computers and cell phones-count as routine border
searches.99
The following section summarizes some of the efforts to reconcile the
law and offer solutions.
III. Controversy in the Current Literature
For some, the focus is to pose the essential question: whether the
"significant impact on privacy interests recognized in Riley will be
sufficient to require a showing of individualized suspicion for border
searches of digitally stored information." 00 Others take a stance that can
be described as generally falling into one of three camps: (1) reasonable
suspicion should be required for all digital device searches at the border;
(2) reasonable suspicion should be required for some digital device
searches at the border; or (3) reasonable suspicion is never required for
digital device searches at the border. All of these scenarios, however, leave
unresolved the elephant in the room: what is the difference between a
routine and nonroutine search, anyway?
A. Reasonable Suspicion Should Be Required for All Digital Device
Border Searches
Some scholars urging reasonable suspicion for all digital searches
focus on privacy, the particularity of the search, and the metaphysical
nature of digital data.
99. United States v. Kolsuz, 185 F. Supp. 3d 843, 853 (E.D. Va. May 5, 2016).
100. Andrew Pincus, Evolving Technology and the Fourth Amendment: The Implications of
Riley v. California, 2014 CATO SUP. CT. REv. 307, 336 (2014); see Jordi de la Torre,
Development in the Judicial Branch: The Ninth Circuit Holds that a Forensic Examination of a
Laptop at the Border Requires Reasonable Suspicion, 28 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 507, 513-14 (2014)
("If another federal court of appeals [in addition to the Ninth Circuit] or a state's highest court in
the future upholds a suspicionless forensic examination of electronic devices at the border, the
Supreme Court is likely to intervene in order to settle the question."); see also, e.g., Jody Thomas
L6pez-Jacobs, Is There a Border Exception to the Exclusionary Rule?, 87 TEMP. L. REv. 611,
643 (2015) (stating that enforcing the exclusionary rule at the border "will incentivize border
officials to continue conducting searches under existing Fourth Amendment limitations. . . . [and]
refrain from conducting invasive, nonroutine searches (such as strip searches and x-ray searches)
unless they have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity." This, in turn, "will ensure that courts
continue to debate Fourth Amendment issues, such as whether the forensic search of Howard
Cotterman's laptop is constitutional-with or without reasonable suspicion of illegal activity ...
and that one's Fourth Amendment rights are not virtually forfeited by merely crossing an
international line.").
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One author posits that "[t]he central question . . . is whether searches
of electronic devices are seen as more like strip searches or more like pat-
downs."' Summing up the results of a survey, the author found that
"[e]lectronic-device searches are seen as among the most intrusive of those
described in the current case law. They are the most revealing of sensitive
information. They are only less embarrassing than strip searches and body
cavity searches."0 2 Thus, the article urges, "[i]mposing a reasonable
suspicion standard for searches of electronic devices would be a fairly
modest step given the strength of the privacy interests implicated," which,
based on the study, "are very powerful. They are more powerful, in fact,
than some courts have presumed."'03
Another scholar's concern with privacy leads to a focus on ensuring
"particularity" in computer searches: "the means by which a search is
'carefully tailored to its justifications' and does not become a general
exploratory search." 0 4 Digital searches are especially concerning, since
"large amounts of data-some relevant to the investigation, but much of it
likely irrelevant-are stored on a computer, cellphone or email account."'05
Based on these concerns, the author lauds Riley for providing "support to
lower courts considering whether to adopt Cotterman's reasonable
suspicion requirement for intensive electronic searches at the border, and
suggests even a simple cursory look through a phone at the border may be
constitutionally problematic."'06
Just as rifling through all of the data on a phone goes
beyond the Chimel justifications for the search incident to
arrest exception, a search of an electronic device-
allowing government access into reams of digital data-is
more invasive than necessary to monitor what comes in
and out of the border, particularly when so much data is
101. Matthew B. Kugler, The Perceived Intrusiveness of Searching Electronic Devices at the
Border: An Empirical Study, 81 U. CHI. L. REv. 1165, 1177 (2014) (referring to United States v.
Montoya de Hernandez, in which the Court held that reasonable suspicion was required for the
nonroutine search of contents expelled from Defendant's alimentary canal after overnight
detention; and Flores-Montano, in which the Court held that no reasonable suspicion is necessary
to search a gas tank, which is a routine search that imputes no privacy interests).
102. Id. at 1211.
103. Id
104. Hanni M. Fakhoury, Digital Searches After Riley v. California, 39-MAR Champion 36,
39 (2015) (quoting Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84(1987)).
105. Fakhoury, supra note 104, at 39.
106. Id.
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stored remotely in the cloud rather than on the electronic
device directly. 107
Finally, the concept of remote storage overlaps with the approach of
those who view the issue as raising a question of physical intangibility.
While a gas tank is
strictly "property" in the classical sense, in that it does
not . . . assume or take upon itself the personhood of its
owner . . . . clearly such a piece of property as a laptop or
smart phone possesses a greater measure of personhood
than a gas tank, if anything for the digital device's ability
to embody and transmit the person's thoughts and
expressions.s08
Along with "personhood," the digital device's contents are intangible
and "strikes the traveler as removed from the scope and ambit of the
search." 09 Unlike a traditional physical search of a "container" that stores
files, searching a laptop or digital device provides "access to a digital realm
that is removed from any physical spatio-temporal location . . . ."10 The
author thus compares a digital search to an "extended border search," and
concludes that, "all border searches of digital devices," not just those where
the device is detained for a prolonged period or when a forensic analysis is
conducted, necessitate reasonable suspicion."'
B. Reasonable Suspicion or Probable Cause Should Be Required for
Certain Kinds of Digital Device Border Searches, and Legislation
May (or May Not) be the Solution
Many others narrow the reasonable suspicion requirement to apply
only to certain kinds of searches at the border, alternatively defined as
107. Id.
108. Tom Rechtin, Back to the Future of Your Laptop: How Backlash Over Prolonged
Detention of Digital Devices in Border Searches Is Symptomatic of a Need for "Reasonable
Suspicion" in All Border Searches of Digital Devices, 7 THE CRIT: CRITICAL STUD. J. 66, 87
(2014).
109. Id. at 88; see Victoria Wilson, Laptops and the Border Search Exception to the Fourth
Amendment: Protecting the United States Borders From Bombs, Drugs, and the Pictures From
Your Vacation, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 999, 1019 (2011) ("The authority to open a laptop to search
for physical objects without suspicion should not extend to the information contained within the
laptop.").
110. Rechtin, supra note 108, at 89.
111. Id. at 89-90.
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"forensic," "nonroutine," "exhaustive," "intrusive," or "intensive," with
many using one or more of these terms interchangeably.12
"[T]here are times when the government must realize that the nature
of certain types of searches goes too far when weighed against an
individual's privacy interests."" 3 While maintaining that national security
is paramount, "an 'exhaustive forensic search of a copied laptop hard
drive,"' urges the author, "is one of those times . . . [because it] 'intrudes
upon privacy and dignity interests to a far greater degree than a cursory
search at the border.""'14
In fact, "[g]iven the Supreme Court's conclusion that digital searches
can be more intrusive than the search of a home, and are fundamentally
different from searches of a person or physical property," another author
questions whether the border search exception should apply to digital
searches at all." 5 Assuming that some sort of border exception exists, the
author urges that digital searches should require reasonable suspicion or
even probable cause.116 "[C]ourts should treat digital searches as
nonroutine . . . and [do] away with the distinction between manual and
forensic searches."1 7 Indeed, "Riley's recognition of the unique
intrusiveness of a digital search supports a probable cause standard."118
In contrast, another view "reject[s] the argument that he large storage
capacity of laptops and their capability to store personal information makes
laptops completely distinct from any nondigital object,"'19 and advocates
for viewing personal digital device border searches instead as "a close
relative of special needs searches."2 0 The author calls for a simplified
application of the conventional special needs balancing test to digital
112. See, e.g., infra at notes 113-28; cf Ari B. Fontecchio, Suspicionless Laptop Searches
Under the Border Search Doctrine: The Fourth Amendment Exception that Swallows Your
Laptop, 31 CARDOZO L. REv. 231, 236 (2009) ("[T]he government should require a customs
agent to have 'one good reason' before performing an intrusive data search at the border. This
standard would require an officer to have more than no suspicion yet less than a reasonable
suspicion or probable cause to search the data inside one's laptop.").
113. Ryne Spengler, Hilacked at the Border: Why the Government Should Have Reasonable
Suspicion Before Conducting Intrusive Examinations of Our Personal Electronic Devices, 11
SETON HALL CIR. REV. 431, 452(2015).
114. Id at 452 (citing United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 951, 966 (9th Cir. 2013)).




118. Id at 1995-96.
119. Sid Nadkarni, "Let's Have a Look, Shall We?" A Model for Evaluating Suspicionless
Border Searches ofPortable Electronic Devices, 61 UCLA L. REV. 146, 152 (2013).
120. Id. at 151.
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border searches, and to determine intrusiveness by considering factors
relevant in other special needs cases. 121 However, "searches that are
nonforensic and that reveal minimal information to human observation
would be more likely to be permissible without any level of suspicion."1 2 2
Requiring anything less than probable cause, however, raises another
concern.12 3 "[F]orward-thinking federal agents"12 4 may consider the border
search exception as a warrant loophole where, lacking probable cause, law
enforcement officers "could wait for their suspect to arrive at the border
and then have customs officials search the suspect's digital devices based
only on reasonable suspicion-or no suspicion at all for a conventional
search."125 Since "Riley does not foreclose warrantless searches of
electronics at the border,"1 26 the author explains that "the government can
use the [border search] exception to skirt traditional Fourth Amendment
protections."1 27 The author concludes that "more intensive searches" of
electronic devices should require reasonable suspicion.128
The suggestion of a legislative approach for suspicionless border
searches raises controversy as well. One position is that the simultaneous
importance of the government's interests and the significant individual
privacy concerns posed by the border search exception for electronic
searches, in conjunction with the current state of the law, makes the
Supreme Court "highly unlikely to provide a judicial remedy requiring
heightened suspicion for forensic computer searches."1 29 Thus, the likely
solution is through the legislative process.'30
121. Id. at 153-54 (Other relevant factors include "the nature and amount of the information
searched, the duration of the search, and the presence or absence of an extended detention of the
property.").
122. Id. at 188.
123. Jared Janes, The Border Search Doctrine in the Digital Age: Implications of Riley v.
California on Border Law Enforcement's Authority for Warrantless Searches of Electronic
Devices, 35 REv. LITIG. 71, 102 (2016).
124. Id at 99.
125. Id at 102.
126. Id. at 99.
127. Id at 101. As an example, the author cites United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d
536 (D. Md. 2014), in which, by deliberately placing Saboonchi on the travel watch list, agents
were able to be alerted as soon as he traveled internationally, providing the opportunity to search
his electronics, though his crime, trade violations with Iran, "had nothing to do with his presence
at the border." Id. at 99.
128. Id at 75, 99.
129. Samuel A. Townsend, Laptop Searches at the Border and United States v. Cotterman,
94 B.U. L. REv. 1745, 1779 (2014).
130. Id
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In contrast stands the position that legislation requiring individualized
suspicion for intrusive digital devices is unlikely, based on the "failures of
recent Congressional efforts to curb digital border searches . . . ."
Instead, "[b]ecause the executive and legislative branches have proved
unwilling and unable to subject any type of digital border search to a
reasonable suspicion standard, reform is most likely to come from the
judiciary." 32
Thus, even among those who favor some form of reasonable
suspicion, controversy is rife.
C. No Reasonable Suspicion Is Required for Digital Device Border
Searches
At the other end of the spectrum is the position that no particularized
suspicion is ever required for any digital border searches. One reason for
this view is that requiring reasonable suspicion for forensic examinations is
administratively impractical and would impede law enforcement agents'
ability to protect national security.'33 This argument urges a return to the
container analogy and that all forms of property should be treated the same,
regardless of storage capacity:
Suitcases, luggage, and any other traditional storage
containers are always subjected to suspicionless border
searches even if they contain large amounts of personal
information. Merely converting the personal information
contained in a suitcase into an electronic form should not
be enough to bestow heightened constitutional
protection.134
Furthermore, since border agents "have the ability to copy data from
confiscated hard drives to government-owned devices[, t]his data can then
be shared with a variety of government agencies or even retained for an
indefinite period of time without ever alerting travelers."l35 The solution
"to prevent the misuse of this sensitive information," the author posits, is to
implement agency regulations, and grant travelers the right to sue Customs
131. Nadkami,supra note 119, at179.
132. Id. at 180.
133. Michael Creta, A Step in the Wrong Direction: The Ninth Circuit Requires Reasonable
Suspicion for Forensic Examinations of Electronic Storage Devices During Border Searches in
United States v. Cotterman, 55 B.C. L. REV. E. SUPPLEMENT 31, 40-45 (2014).
134. Id. at 41.
135. Id. at 43-44.
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and Border Patrol or Immigration and Customs Enforcement "for directive
violations."l36
The controversy in the current literature demonstrates a need for
clarity and closure on the issue of digital device border searches.
IV. Proposal: Application to Digital Device Searches at the
Border
This Article approaches the solution of a reasonable suspicion
standard for all digital devices without hinging analysis on the
routine/nonroutine paradigm. This section discusses why the paradigm
should change, first, by briefly addressing three fundamental precepts.
Next, this section proposes an alternative that takes the elephant out of the
room and considers both inbound and outbound travelers and what "reason
to suspect that criminal activity [is] afoot" should encompass.137
A. Why the Paradigm Should Change
First, the privacy concerns implicated by Riley for cell phones apply
equally to all digital devices. Despite Riley's clear directive that cell
phones, as a digital device, are different in both a "quantitative and
qualitative sense" from other objects that were the traditional object of
searches,138 some courts have been reluctant to abandon the digital device
as container model.139 Riley also established that a cell phone is much
more than a phone. The "term 'cell phone' is itself misleading shorthand;
many of these devices are in fact minicomputers that also happen to have
the capacity to be used as a telephone. They could just as easily be called
cameras, video players, rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders, libraries,
diaries, albums, televisions, maps, or newspapers."1 40 Thus, the privacy
implications for searching "cell phones" applies to all digital devices,
136. Id. at 44-45.
137. See, e.g., United States v. Kim, 103 F. Supp. 3d 32, 35 (D.D.C. 2015).
138. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct 2473, 2489 (2014).
139. See, e.g., supra at note 71.
140. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489 (emphasis added); see United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d
952 (9th Cir. 2013), petition for cert. filed, Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Cotterman, 2014 WL
491626, at *3 (2014) (No. 13-186) ("Although [Riley and Wurie] involved telephones rather than
laptop computers, that distinction is no longer important, having diminished over the years as the
functions of those devices merge. Personal electronic devices of all shapes and sizes now
commonly have internet connectivity, search capability, and the capacity to hold a lifetime of
highly personal information, including photos and videos.").
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particularly of the "mini" variety that a traveler is likely to be carrying at
the border.14 1
Second, recognizing that the privacy implications for cell phones,
laptops, or other digital devices are indistinguishable, the next issue is
whether an expectation of privacy is maintained for digital devices at the
border. The answer is yes.
Searches at the border that are physically destructive or particularly
offensive have been subject to a reasonable suspicion standard.142 While a
search of the digital contents of a device does not raise the specter of
physical destruction, it does raise the specter of being particularly
offensive. A search is "particularly offensive" if it is highly intrusive into
the dignity and privacy interest of the person searched.143 It has been
suggested that the category of "particularly offensive" should be limited to
searches of a person such as strip searches, body cavity searches, and
involuntary x-ray searches.144 This notion, however, relies on the
traditional model of physical items as mere containers that Riley has made
obsolete, and disregards what Riley called the quantitatively and
qualitatively unique characteristics of digital devices.145 An attempt to
impose such a limitation has already been outright rejected. In Kim, the
government attempted to argue that the search of defendant's laptop "was
not physically invasive or embarrassing and not even destructive of the
laptop itself, which was returned to the defendant intact."146 The court
refuted this approach, describing it as "the task of applying eighteenth-
century principles to this twenty-first-century technology."l47
[G]iven the vast storage capacity of even the most basic
laptops, and the capacity of computers to retain metadata
and even deleted material, one cannot treat an electronic
141. See, e.g., United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536 (D. Md. 2014) (concerning
smart phones and a flash drive); United States v. Lara, 815 F.3d 605 (9th Cir. 2016) (regarding
cell phones); United States v. Molina-Gomez, 781 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2015) (involving a laptop and
electronic gaming system).
142. United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2008); see KIM, supra note 41, at 2.
143. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 540 n.3 (1985).
144. Id. at 541 n.4; see United States v. Feiten, No. 15-20631, 2016 WL 894452, at *7 (E.D.
Mich. Mar. 9, 2016); House v. Napolitano, No. 11-10852-DJC, 2012 WL 1038816, at *7 (D.
Mass. Mar. 28 2012); see also supra notes68-70.
145. See, e.g., David D. Cole, After Snowden: Regulating Technology-Aided Surveillance in
the Digital Age, 44 CAP. U. L. REv. 677, 679-80 (2016).
146. United States v. Kim, 103 F. Supp. 3d 32,50 (D.D.C. 2015).
147. Id. at 51.
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storage device like a handbag simply because you can put
things in it and then carry it onto a plane.148
The district court in Arnold similarly held that the government's
border search of the information on the defendant's electronic storage
devices violated the Fourth Amendment:
Fourth Amendment protection extends to the search of this
type of personal and private information at the border.
While not physically intrusive as is the case of a strip or
body cavity search, the search of one's private and
valuable personal information stored on a hard drive or
other electronic storage device can be just as much, if not
more, of an intrusion into the dignity and privacy interests
of a person. This is because electronic storage devices
function as an extension of our own memory. They are
capable of storing our thoughts, ranging from the most
whimsical to the most profound. Therefore, government
intrusions into the mind-specifically those that would
cause fear or apprehension in a reasonable person-are no
less deserving of Fourth Amendment scrutiny than
intrusions that are physical in nature. 149
Although the district court was reversed on appeal, the court's
observations recognize the shortsightedness of limiting intrusions
considered particularly offensive merely to the physical realm. In the
modern digital age, reality is much more layered and complex. Use of the
cell phone, or other digital items, has become an integral part of multiple
aspects of daily life 150 and viewing one's collective activities in that realm
will produce a detailed, intimate, individual portrait of the user.
148. Id. at 50.
149. United States v. Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1000-01 (C.D. Cal. 2006), rev'd, 533
F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2008).
150. See supra note 7.
151. Cf "mosaic theory" in United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (holding that government's attachment of global-positioning-system to undercarriage
of motor vehicle, and use of that device to monitor vehicle's movements, constituted a search in
violation of Fourth Amendment) ("I would take these attributes of GPS monitoring into account
when considering the existence of a reasonable societal expectation of privacy in the sum of
one's public movements. I would ask whether people reasonably expect that their movements
will be recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the Government to ascertain, more or
less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on."); see Cole, supra note
145, at 683.
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The third fundamental precept is that case-by-case assessments are
undesirable. Weighing the traditional tension between individual privacy
and effective law enforcement for each individual situation is an ineffective
model for deciding whether, and to what extent, to search digital devices at
the border. Such a model would be inconsistent with Riley's prerogatives.
The Riley Court recognized that assigning law enforcement officers
the task of determining which type of cell phone data was searchable
incident to arrest, or in what situations specific types of data might be
searchable, would provide "no practical limit at all when it comes to cell
phone searches,"l52 impose few meaningful constraints on officers,"l53 and
"launch courts on a difficult line-drawing expedition." 54 The Supreme
Court rejected the prospect of a case-by-case analysis of which digital files
can be searched incident to arrest. 15 The Court also rejected the prospect
of creating rules that would allow partial searches, limited for example to
call logs, which could be conducted incident to arrest.156 Instead, Riley
categorically asserted that any search of a cell phone seized incident to
arrest requires probable cause.157 The same concerns about imposing
meaningful constraints and launching courts on line-drawing expeditions
should apply to digital devices generally.
Even if case-by-case assessments were desirable, the approach is
irreconcilably hindered by the fact that the terms "routine," "nonroutine,"
"forensic," and "manual" remain undefined. Although the search in
Cotterman was deemed forensic, the Ninth Circuit did not define what a
"forensic" search is.'5 8 "The majority never defines 'forensic,' leaving
border agents to wonder exactly what searches are off-limits." 1 59 Thus
even Cotterman, a case that establishes a rule that forensic searches are
nonroutine and require reasonable suspicion, leaves the same challenge that
led Riley to hold that all cell phone searches require a warrant. The
152. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2492 (2014).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 2493.
155. Id. at 2491.
156. Id at 2492; see supra notes 15-19.
157. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2495.
158. United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2013), petition for cert. filed,
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Cotterman, 2014 WL 491626, at *8-9 (2014) (No. 13-186); see
Miller, supra note 117, at 1959 ("The Court has yet to define what searches would be
'nonroutine,' or what level of process it would impose for such searches.")
159. Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 978 (Callahan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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fundamental question remains: what exactly is the difference between a
"routine" and "nonroutine" border search of a laptop?1 60
The Ninth Circuit in Cotterman assumes that manual searches do not
rise to the level of being intrusive enough to be deemed nonroutine.161
Indeed, a one-minute view of a call log at the primary inspection area
might well be considered routine and nonintrusive. It is not an extended
border search. It does not view archives of personal data. A limited glance
might very well be the true equivalent of quickly rifling through a pocket
address book in the predigital era. Such a search would not in itself
objectively trigger the privacy concerns about the massive amounts and
unique types of data that a cell phone carries, nor raise questions such as
the significance of viewing data that is stored in the cloud rather than on
the physical device.
On the other hand, manual searches may expose a great deal of
personal information. As one district court observed, "a manual search can
be just as invasive as a full forensic examination." 62
[T]he privacy interests involved in searches of modern cell
phones are present both during manual and forensic
searches. While a forensic examination is more intrusive,
a manual search of a modern cell phone certainly exposes
the same type of information discussed in Riley-
messages, photos, contacts list, call logs, etc.-both in
isolated form and in combination.163
Even if the terms "routine" and "nonroutine" or "manual" and
"forensic" could be defined with any certainty, the actual searches will fall
on a sliding scale because each digital search will differ from the next.
Searches of even identical devices may vary by actual files searched, length
of time searched, whether images were viewed, whether an incriminating
application was merely glimpsed or actually opened, whether the traveler
voluntarily relinquished a password-protected file, and so on. Determining
the point at which any given search transitions from a nonroutine to a
160. See supra Part Ill (discussing lack of a definition of the terms "routine" and
"nonroutine" in Cotterman).
161. Cotterman, 709 F.3d at967.
162. United States v. Ramos, 190 F. Supp. 3d 992, 1003 (S.D. Cal. 2016).
163. Id at 1001; see Orin Kerr, What is the Ninth Circuit's Standard for Border Searches
Under United States v. Cotterman? VOLOKIH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 11, 2013, 3:12 PM), http://vol
okh.com/2013/03/11 /what-is-the-ninth-circuits-standard-for-border-searches-under-united-states-
v-cotterman (raising some very good questions about the manual-forensic distinction of the
Cotterman decision).
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merely routine search or vice-versa poses the problematic case-by-case
analysis that Riley already firmly proscribed in the cell phone context.
Accordingly, asking law enforcement to distinguish between a
forensic, or "nonroutine" search, and a nonforensic, or "routine" laptop
search would open up the same minefield of uncertainty that Riley rejected.
To answer the question of what level of search is nonroutine, the courts
would, once again, be forced to resort to a balancing test of weighing the
level of intrusiveness, or physical destruction, against the strength of the
government interest. This would create an endless spiral of case-by-case
evaluations. In the Cotterman petition, the petitioner urged case-by-case
assessments, arguing that the "justification" of "reasonable suspicion" was
insufficient to validate the search because the Ninth Circuit should also
scrutinize the search's "scope" and "manner."'64 The Supreme Court
rejected the writ.1 65
B. An Alternative Paradigm
This Article reinforces the argument that the reasonable suspicion
standard should be triggered for a search of any digital item at the border
and proposes to take the elephant out of the room; to include outbound, as
well as inbound travelers; and clarify the meaning of "criminal activity
afoot." 166
1. Take the Elephant Out of the Room
First, no distinction should be made between between routine and
nonroutine, or forensic and manual, searches. The Cotterman petition
reasonably argues that the holding created an overly broad, undefined, and
164. United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2013), petition for cert. filed,
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Cotterman, 2014 WL 491626, at *4-6 (2014) (No. 13-186).
165. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 899 (2014).
166. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) ("We merely hold today that where a police
officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his
experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may
be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies
himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of
the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for
the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer
clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.")
(emphasis added). This Article does not dissect the Circuit split created by Cotterman, which is
documented by the dissent in Cotterman itself. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 9542, 983 (M. Smith, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he court creates a circuit split regarding the application of reasonable suspicion
to border searches of electronic devices"; citations to Third and Fourth Circuit cases omitted); see
Abidor v. Napolitano, 990 F. Supp. 2d 260, 281 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
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unworkable rule.167 The unworkability, however, arises from the Ninth
Circuit's decision being contingent on distinguishing "routine" from
"nonroutine" digital searches.
This Article proposes that the elephant be taken out of the room: the
reasonable suspicion standard should be triggered for border digital device
searches-not because they are considered nonroutine, but because they are
digital devices. The Riley Court rejected distinguishing between different
levels of a cell phone search.168 In the same manner, courts should reject
distinguishing between routine and nonroutine levels of intrusiveness for a
digital device border search. The fact that a cell phone may be on the
person incident to arrest did not insulate the cell phone from the
requirement of a warrant. The search incident to arrest exception did not
justify dispensing with a warrant requirement before officers could search
digital data on cell phones under either the traditional concern for the
officers' safety or fear of destruction of evidence.1 6 9 Likewise, the fact that
a digital device is on the traveler should not insulate the digital device from
the requirement of reasonable suspicion. While the distinction between
routine and nonroutine works for searches of containers and human bodies,
the concepts are inapposite to digital data.170
The proposal that all digital searches, whether manual or forensic, be
generally considered nonroutine is a step in the right direction.'71 The
landscape can be clarified even further by establishing that all digital
border searches should require reasonable suspicion, without even the
contingency of categorizing digital border searches as nonroutine. Riley
did not require a warrant for a cell phone search because the search would
be intrusive; indeed, evidence of the crime of arrest may well be discovered
in a cursory, as well as extensive, search of a cell phone. Riley simply
167. United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2013), petition for cert. filed,
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Cotterman, 2014 WL 491626, at *8 (2014) (No. 13-186).
168. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491-93 (2014).
169. Id. at 2485-88.
170. Just in September 2016, one court even took the position that the routine/nonroutine
framework has relevance only in intrusive searches of the person; thus, without directly saying so,
this decision suggests, like this Article, that digital searches should not be classified as either
routine or nonroutine. In Czarnecki v. United States, the district court aligned itself with the
Government's position "that both the United States Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have
rejected the routine/nonroutine framework for analyzing border cases. The Ninth Circuit has
stated that . . . the Supreme Court 'made clear that a showing of "reasonable suspicion" was not
required simply because the search went beyond a "routine" search."' Czarnecki v. United
States, No. C15-0421JLR, 2016 WL 5395549, at *8 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 27, 2016) (citation
omitted). Thus, the district court stated that it "is inclined to agree with the Government that '[a]t
most, the routine/non-routine framework is limited to "intrusive searches of the person" such as
the alimentary canal search in Montoya de Hernandez. "' Id. at *8 (citation omitted).
171. See Miller, supra note 115, at 1995-96.
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required a warrant for any search of a cell phone seized incident to arrest.172
Likewise, no need exists to categorize digital searches as nonroutine in
order to trigger the reasonable suspicion requirement. This Article
therefore suggests that the terms "routine" and "nonroutine" be removed
from the vernacular for describing digital searches. In this way, finally, the
elephant can be coaxed out of the room.
Requiring "reasonable suspicion" even for mere "manual" searches,
assuming there is agreement as to what that even means, formalizes the de
facto process. The reality is that agents have limited resources to search
every electronic device that passes through the country's borders and are
limited to searching those devices where the traveler's conduct rouses some
type of suspicion anyway:
The greatest obstacle to ferreting out contraband at the
border has always been the sheer number of international
travelers. Any contention that national security will be
critically hampered by stripping border agents of a critical
law enforcement tool-suspicionless forensic
examinations of electronics-is undermined by the fact
that, as a matter of commonsense and resources, it is only
when reasonable suspicion is aroused that such searches
typically take place. See, e.g., Chaudhry, 424 F.3d at 1054
(B. Fletcher, J., concurring) ("As a practical matter, border
agents are too busy to do extensive searches (removing gas
tanks and door panels, boring holes in truck beds) unless
they have suspicion."). As Judge Callahan acknowledges
in her separate opinion, the record suggests that "remote
and/or intensive searches of electronic devices crossing the
border do not occur all that often." Concurrence at 978 n.
11. The reference that only a small fraction of travelers at
the border have their devices searched simply reinforces
our point-our ruling will not place an undue burden on
border agents who already rely on a degree of suspicion in
referring travelers to secondary inspection.173
172. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2495.
173. United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 967 n.14 (9th Cir. 2013); see id. at 978 n.I1
(Callahan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (perceiving that border agents are able to
conduct few intensive searches of electronic devices, but concluding that requiring reasonable
suspicion for such searches is therefore unnecessary). See also Nadkarni, supra note 119, at 192;
United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006).
Spring 20171 ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM 305
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
"Reasonable suspicion" imposes the minimal requirement for
suspicion that is more than the next level of process, which is no suspicion
at all.174 Yet, instituting reasonable suspicion as a requirement for all
digital searches acknowledges travelers' expectation of privacy in digital
devices at the border-without encumbering agents' ability to do their job.
"This standard is far from onerous and still leaves officers with
considerable freedom to search suspicious persons and respond to
unexpected factual developments."l75
Finally, the exigent circumstances exception left open in Riley can
similarly apply at the border to allow agents to conduct a search without
even reasonable suspicion, if exigent circumstances arise. It is hard to
imagine what such a scenario might look like, but just as Riley left the door
open for allowing a warrantless search of cell phone data when faced with
"some of the more extreme hypotheticals that have been suggested,"1 76 a
court may likewise leave the door open for a digital search without any
particularized suspicion whatsoever, if faced with an "extreme" scenario.
"[C]ustoms officials retain the ability to conduct suspicionless searches of
cell phones in situations falling under the exigent circumstances
exception."
"Routine" and "nonroutine" are awkward fulcrums for determining
the intrusiveness of the digital search and whether reasonable suspicion
consequently is required. Riley held simply, "Get a warrant." The
corollary at the border should be, "Get reasonable suspicion"-not because
the search is forensic or nonroutine, whatever those terms mean-but
because it is a digital device.
174. See id. at 960 ("Our review necessarily encompasses a determination as to the
applicable standard, no suspicion, reasonable suspicion or probable cause."); see also United
States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2013), petition for cert. Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
Cotterman, 2014 WL 491626, at *3 (2014) (No. 13-186); Abidor v. Napolitano, 990 F. Supp. 2d
260, 276 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
175. United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 570 (D. Md. 2014) (citations
omitted). Even in a case where the court determined that reasonable suspicion was not needed
because the search of the laptop was nonforensic, whereas Cotterman requires reasonable
suspicion only for forensic examinations, the agent's initial search was motivated by reasonable
suspicion, i.e., a travel itinerary that suggested involvement in narcotics trafficking. Kennedy v.
United States, No. C12-1088RAJ, 2014 WL 954872, at *1-2 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 11, 2014); see
Jon Adams, Rights at United States Borders, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 353, 365 (2005) (stating that
reasonable suspicion can be found by "[a]n itinerary suggestive of wrongdoing, (e.g. traveling to
or from a country known for exporting drugs)" (citations omitted)).
176. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494 (2014).
177. United States v. Ramos, 190 F. Supp. 3d 992, 1003 (S.D. Cal. 2016).
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2. Clarify Border Search to Include Outbound Travelers; Clarify the
Meaning of "Criminal Activity Afoot"
While requiring reasonable suspicion for all digital device border
searches recognizes individual privacy interests, law enforcement needs
will also be recognized by clarifying border searches to include inbound
and outbound travelers and the meaning of "criminal activity afoot."
a. Include Inbound and Outbound Travelers
Guidance is needed as to whether a "border search" includes exit
from, as well as entry into, the United States. This Article proposes that,
just as a digital device does not fit the traditional physical container model,
searching a digital device should not be limited to physical entry into the
country's boundaries.
The Customs and Border Patrol Directive states that border search
guidelines apply to "both inbound and outbound" travelers carrying
electronic devices.178 However, numerous courts have questioned whether
the border search doctrines apply to those leaving the United States.
In United States v. Kim, the court took exception to the fact that the
defendant was exiting, rather than entering, the country. The court noted
that "[w]hile there is authority that states that the government's broad
authority at the border extends to those exiting the country as well as to
those coming in . . . the justifications for the exception to the warrant
requirement are generally framed in terms of threats posed at the point of
entry."l79
One year later, in United States v. Kolsuz, the district court observed
similarly that while the government has "a significant interest at the border
in protecting its territory and national security 'by stopping and examining
persons crossing into this country,' . . . the Supreme Court has consistently
justified the government's interests at the border 'in terms of threats posed
at the point of entry."'"80 Thus, "none of the significant government
interests in monitoring what enters the country applies where, as here, the
178. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE BORDER
SEARCHES OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES (2009). The Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Directive 7-6.1 similarly mandates that its directive "applies to searches of electronic devices of
all persons arriving in, departing from, or transiting through the United States .... "
179. United States v. Kim, 103 F. Supp. 3d 32, 56 (D.D.C. 2015) (citations omitted); see
United States v. Seljan, 547 F.3d 993, 999 (9th Cir. 2008) ("Because searches at the international
border of both inbound and outbound persons or property are conducted 'pursuant to the long-
standing right of the sovereign to protect itself,' they generally require neither a warrant nor
individualized suspicion."); see also United States v. Cardona, 769 F.2d 625, 629 (9th Cir. 1985)
("[Tlhere is no principled basis to conclude that the extended border search doctrine does not
apply with equal force to exit searches as it does to entry searches.").
180. United States v. Kolsuz, 185 F. Supp. 3d 843, 857 (E.D. Va. 2016).
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object of a warrantless border search was exiting the country."'81 From
there, the court deduces, rather awkwardly, that "[t]his interest is not
directly implicated where, as here, a government agent conducts a forensic
search of a cell phone, as the digital contents of a cell phone are not banned
by export control regulations." 82
Even more recently, the district court in United States v. Feiten
emphasized entry, versus exit, at the border: "[T]he Supreme Court has
recognized a broad exception to the Fourth Amendment's requirement of
probable cause or a warrant for searches conducted at the border because
[t]he Government interest in preventing the entry of unwanted persons and
effects is at its zenith at the international border."'83
Digital devices pose threats that traditional "merchandise" and
"baggage"'84 did not. Again, the attempt to force "eighteenth-century
principles"'85 upon current realities of twenty-first century travel creates
incongruity and loses sight of the policies behind the principles. The policy
of the United States border exception seeks to "protect itself from terrorist
activities, unlawful migration, and contraband."'86 In the digital era,
national security is no less threatened by the electronic devices of an
outbound, than of an inbound, traveler. The spatial-temporal irrelevance of
digital technology'87 makes concerns about ingress versus egress
inapposite. The government indeed has an interest in preventing crimes
that can be committed by taking data out of, as well as into, the country:
not just child pornography, but also intellectual property thefts; commercial
profit from data banned for export such as software and technology, or
government secrets; and terrorist activity, to name a few examples. The
CBP Directive needs the support of the courts.
b. Clarify the Meaning of "Criminal Activity Afoot"
Just as the distinction between entry and exit no longer makes sense in
the temporal and spatial vacuum of digital devices, the argument that a
border search must involve an ongoing or imminent crime makes little
181. Id. at 857-58.
182. Id.at858.
183. United States v. Feiten, No. 15-20631, 2016 WL 894452, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 9,
2016) (internal citations and quotations marks omitted) (emphasis added).
184. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 178 ("While the terms 'merchandise' and
'baggage' are used, the courts have interpreted border search authorities to extend to all of a
traveler's belongings, including electronic devices and the information in such devices.").
185. United States v. Kim, 103 F. Supp. 3d 32, 51 (D.D.C.2015).
186. KIM, supra note 41, at 1; see Cole, supra note 145, at 680 (citing Jennifer Daskal, The
Un-territoriality ofData, 125 YALE L.J. 326, 329 (2015)).
187. E.g., see generally Rechtin, supra note 108.
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sense in the digital era. First, a threat is not better poised to be committed
simply because a digital device is entering, versus exiting, the United
States; moreover, whether a crime is imminent or not may be
unascertainable when the threat is housed in digital form. A threat from
digital devices lies not in the physical hardware of the device entering a
geographic territory, but in its data. That data may not even be stored in
the hard drive of that specific device, but in fact in the cloud. A focus on
ongoing or imminent crimes assumes that a threat takes a tangible form that
can be intercepted at a certain point in time before damage can be done.
This assumption is incongruous with threats created by the temporally and
spatially irrelevant universe of digital devices.'88
Second, a number of courts that have grappled with the issue of
whether the border search of a digital device needs to involve an imminent
crime have determined this to be a non issue, focusing instead on balancing
the nature and intrusiveness of the search.189 In United States v. Ramos, the
court was unswayed by Defendant's attempts to argue that the search of his
cell phone at the United States-Mexico border was not a border search,
because the purpose was "investigatory."'90 Not only was there no
authority "to suppor[t] the proposition that a border search is somehow
converted into a search incident to arrest if its nature is 'investigatory,"' but
"[a]dditionally, the word 'investigatory,' used as a qualifier by Defendant,
is not helpful here. If the word "investigatory" in this context means
further exploration into the possibility of a crime being committed, every
border search would be investigatory in nature."'9 '
188. See generally id; see also Daskal, supra note 186, at 366 ("[D]ata differs from its
tangible counterparts . . . ." Unlike data, "[p]hysical objects moving from place to place are
constrained by the ordinary laws of physics and by generally observable and conscious choices
about how to move from Point A to PointB.").
189. See, e.g., United States v. Leininger, No. 16-CR-1530-GPC, 2016 WL 6476310, at *7
(S.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2016); United States v. Hernandez, No. 15-CR-2613-GPC, 2016 WL 471943,
at *2-3 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2016).
190. United States v. Ramos, 190 F. Supp. 3d 992, 999-1000 (S.D. Cal. 2016).
191. Id. at 999. The court distinguished United States v. Kim, 103 F. Supp. 3d 32 (D.D.C.
2015), where the court determined that "'[t]here was little or no reason to suspect that criminal
activity was afoot at the time Kim was about to cross the border,"' because there "it was the
combination of many factors . . . that led the court to determine that under the 'unique
circumstances of this case,' the search was unreasonable. At no time did the court adopt the
defendant's position that the investigatory nature of a search disqualifies it as a border search."
Id See also Hernandez, 2016 WL 471943 at *2 ("Hernandez argues that a distinction should be
made between 'investigatory' border searches and 'protecting the United States sovereign
integrity by excluding wanted persons or things.' . . . [However,] the distinction drawn by the
Ninth Circuit was not whether the initial border search had an 'investigatory' function, but the
nature and intrusiveness of the initial border search.").
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Another court similarly concluded that a border search supported by
reasonable suspicion will be upheld even when the relevant international
travel was not clearly related to the suspicion of ongoing or imminent
criminal activity.1 92 In United States v. Touset, the district court held that
Customs appropriately conducted a forensic search of Defendant's devices
at the border based on the Department of Homeland Security
Investigations' instructions that the Defendant's electronic media should be
thoroughly inspected when he attempted to reenter the United States from
abroad for possible possession of child pornography.1 9 3 The court focused
on the objectively reasonable search, which was substantiated by
reasonable suspicion, and dismissed concerns about the purview of customs
and agents' motivations. "As one Magistrate Judge has concluded, '[t]here
is . .. little doubt that preventing the flow of contraband across the United
States' borders, which would include illicit images of child pornography,
falls within the purview of customs enforcement.'"'94 Thus, "' [t]hat
interdiction of contraband can serve both customs and law enforcement
purposes does not negate the validity of a search at the border."" 9 5 Indeed,
held another court, "[o]fficial interagency collaboration, even (and perhaps
especially) at the border, is to be commended, not condemned."1 96
192. United States v. Touset, No. 1:15-CR-45-MHC, 2016 WL 1048047, at *11 (N.D. Ga.
Mar. 11, 2016) (citing United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 571 (D. Md. 2014)).
193. Touset, 2016 WL 1048047, at *3.
194. Id. at *11 (citations omitted); see United States v. Smasal, No. CRIM. 15-85 JRT/BRT,
2015 WL 4622246, at *9-10 (D. Minn. June 19, 2015).
195. Touset, 2016 WL 1048047, at *11 (citing United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S.
149, 150 (2004)); see Smasal, 2015 WL 4622246, at *10. Moreover, the district court in Touset
held that even if a distinction exists between detentions based on law enforcement, versus
customs enforcement, the customs agent's motivation is not the court's concern, as long as the
arrest is objectively justifiable. Touset, 2016 WL 1048047 at *11-12 (citations omitted).
"[C]oncerns about improper motives and pretext do not justify subjective inquiries' in the Fourth
Amendment Context, and . . . '[e]fficient and evenhanded application of the law demands that we
look to whether the [defendant's] arrest is objectively justified, rather than to the motive of the
arresting officer." Id. at *12 (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 740 (2011) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
196. United States v. Levy, 803 F.3d 120, 123 (2d Cir. 2015) ("Whether a Customs official's
reasonable suspicion arises entirely from her own investigation or is prompted by another federal
agency is irrelevant to the validity of a border search, which we have held 'does not depend on
whether it is prompted by a criminal investigative motive."') (citing United States v. Irving, 452
F.3d 110, 123 (2d Cir. 2006)); see also United States v. Cano, No. 16-cr-01770-BTM, 2016 WL
6920449, at *3-4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2016) ("[B]order search cases do not turn on the purpose or
motivation behind the search. Rather, they focus on the degree of intrusiveness in light of the
sovereign's interest at the border . . . . The Ninth Circuit's holding in Cotterman did not depend
on whether the search was 'investigatory' in nature . . . . In fact, several courts in this District
have refused to decide cases involving searches at the border on such a distinction.").
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Moreover, once a search of electronic devices is underway, any efforts
to distinguish between a search for an ongoing crime versus a search that is
investigatory in nature lose meaning. One court skirted Defendant's
contention that "the search in this case was intended to enforce the criminal
laws and not to protect the borders from contraband."l97 The district court
first reiterated that "border searches form 'a narrow exception to the Fourth
Amendment prohibition against warrantless searches without probable
cause," and that "'[t]he Government's interest in preventing the entry of
unwanted persons and effects is at its zenith at the international border."' 98
The court then simply concluded that the Cellebrite border search of
Defendant's electronic devices, after a dog alerted to the dashboard of the
vehicle, which led to the discovery of ten packages of cocaine, was a "non-
forensic scan . .. [that] accessed information available to any manual user
examining electronic devices." 99 Moreover,
The fact that the iPhone and the iPad were password
protected using the Defendant's date of birth did not
transform the Cellebrite search into the type of computer
forensic examination used in Cotterman. Even assuming,
however, that the password protection on the iPhone and
iPad required additional constitutional protections, any
requirement for reasonable suspicion would have been met
in this case. The agents were investigating the smuggling
of controlled substances into the United States.200
Thus, without actually saying so, the court dismissed Defendant's
contention that any distinction should be drawn between enforcing criminal
laws versus protecting the borders from contraband, and rejected the
assertion that the border search was overbroad and lacked reasonable
suspicion.
In line with these cases, this Article urges that, just as efforts to
require reasonable suspicion for digital device searches by distinguishing
between routine and nonroutine searches creates an unmanageable
quagmire, efforts to limit digital device searches by distinguishing between
investigatory and imminent crime searches creates a similarly
197. United States v. Lopez, No. 13CR2092 WQH, 2016 WL 7370030, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Dec.
20,2016).
198. Id. at *3 (citing United States v. Seljan, 547 F.3d 993, 999 (9th Cir. 2008) and Flores-
Montano, 541 U.S. at 149).
199. Id. at *4.
200. Id.
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unmanageable quagmire. Finding reasonable suspicion should be the
hurdle, not distinguishing between ongoing and imminent activity.
In sum, defining "criminal activity afoot" at the border without being
bound to a perception of crime as unfolding in a linear manner is consistent
with those courts that have already recognized the contradictions in
excluding searches that might be deemed merely investigatory. Paired with
including both inbound and outbound travelers, eliminating this distinction,
in harmony with a bright-line rule requiring reasonable suspicion for all
digital device searches, would help provide the balance that is now needed
between individual privacy expectations in the rapidly evolving world of
personal electronic devices and law enforcement interests in searching
them.
Conclusion
It is only a matter of time before the digital search at-the-border issue
is ripe and addressed before the United States Supreme Court. A rule is
necessary that will protect national security interests while accommodating
the new reality that ordinary, non-nefarious travelers, "[a]s denizens of a
digital world . . . [will] carry with them laptop computers, iPhones, iPads,
iPods, Kindles, Nooks, Surfaces, tablets, Blackberries, cell phones, digital
cameras, and more,"201 all of which are capable of carrying personal
information in volumes unanticipated when the Supreme Court imagined
drivers of vehicles carrying "containers."202 Since the 2014 Cotterman
decision, we may add Apple watches and Google glasses to the list, and
this list will only continue to grow. The CBP Directive defines the
category more simply: "Electronic Device. Includes any devices that many
contain information ... 203
Some courts have already begun to propose reasonable suspicion, or
even something more, as the threshold for digital searches at the border.
In April 2016, the district court in United States v. Caballero observed
that the issue of whether a "cursory search of Defendant's cell phone" at
the border search violates the Fourth Amendment "stands at the
intersection of two avenues of law." 204
Heading in one direction is the Supreme Court's bright line
rule in Riley: law enforcement officers must obtain a
201. United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 956 (9th Cir. 2013).
202. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
203. See U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 178.
204. United States v. Caballero, 178 F. Supp. 3d 1008, 1014 (S.D. Cal. 2016).
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warrant to search a cell phone incident to an arrest.
Heading on a different course is the border search
exception . . . [that] describes an exception to general
Fourth Amendment principles. It is the notion that the
government may search without a warrant anyone and
anything coming across its border to protect its national
sovereignty. . . . But, neither the Supreme Court, nor the
Ninth Circuit, has decided a case involving the heightened
privacy interests implicated by a cell phone search at the
border after an arrest.205
The court, bound by Cotterman, concluded that the warrantless,
cursory search of defendant's cell phone was permissible under the border
search doctrine with a showing of something less than reasonable
suspicion, while an extensive search would have required reasonable
206
suspicion. However, "[i]f this [c]ourt were free to decide the question in
the first instance, it would hold that the warrantless cell phone search under
these circumstances would be unreasonable."20 7 While the court expressed
some reservations about applying the Riley standard of probable cause at
the border,208 the court emphasized its greater concern that "a cell phone
search threatens significant individual privacy interests," and reiterated the
concern expressed by the Supreme Court in Riley that "cell phones, as a
category, implicate privacy concerns far beyond those implicated by the
search of a cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse."20 9 Thus, "[a]lthough Riley
could be applied to a cell phone search at the border, this [c]ourt is bound
by Cotterman."210
Similarly, in June 2016, the district court in United States v. Ramos
stated that "[a]dopting the reasonable suspicion standard currently used
only for forensic examinations of digital devices . . . as the standard for all
border searches of cell phones[] may be a prudent way to harmonize
Riley's concerns with the salutary border search principles."2 11 In a
footnote, the court observed, "Such a standard would also allay the concern
expressed in Riley that ad hoc, case-by-case determination provides
205. Id. (internal citations omitted).
206. Id. at 1016.
207. Id. at 1017.
208. Id. 1017 n.9.
209. Id. at 1017-18 (quoting United States v. Camou, 773 F.3d 932, 943 (9th Cir. 2014)
(quoting Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2488-89 (2014)).
210. Caballero, 178 F. Supp. 3d at 1018.
211. United States v. Ramos, 190 F. Supp. 3d 992, 1003 (S.D. Cal. 2016).
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insufficient direction to law enforcement."212 Indeed, this Article urges that
such a standard provides the balance that is needed between the critical
interests of both law enforcement and the private individual.
The Cotterman and Riley decisions provide guidance needed for
honoring the Fourth Amendment in the digital era. One district court
recently "acknowledge[d] that '[i]t may be that the 'technology is
different' rationale that led the Riley Court to treat an arrestee's cell
phone differently from his wallet [in the country's interior] will one
day lead the [Supreme] Court to treat' an individual's cell phone
differently from other property at the border as well." 2 13 Indeed, along
with other cases testing the government's limits on searches via drones,
GPS trackers, cell phones, and genetic profiling, this issue of digital
devices searches at the border is certain to re-emerge before the U.S.
Supreme Court, with privacy implications for us all, at a time when we face
threats from terrorists and xenophobes alike.
212. Id. at 1003 n.9.
213. United States v. Molina-Isidoro, No. EP-16-CR-1402-PRM, 2016 WL 8138926, at *8
(W.D. Tex. Oct. 7, 2016) (holding that search of defendant's cell phone at the border was
supported by reasonable suspicion) (citing United States v. Guerrero, 768 F.3d 351, 360 (5th Cir.
2014).
[Vol. 44:3314
